Connect with us

Politics

Bill to establish LG election independent commission passes first reading at Senate

Published

on

If the bill is enacted, the commission will take over the functions of the 36 states’ independent electoral commissions.

A bill seeking to establish a Local Government Independent Electoral Commission has passed its first reading at the Senate.

The bill was passed Thursday during the plenary after the Senate Leader, Opeyemi Bamidele, introduced it.

It was sponsored by Sani Musa (APC, Niger East).

It seeks to establish a National Independent Local Government Electoral Commission (NILGEC) responsible for conducting elections to the office of the local government chairman and councillors and any other matter thereof to do with local government as a third tier of government.

Last week, the Supreme Court affirmed the financial autonomy of Nigeria’s 774 local governments.

The Deputy Senate President, Barau Jibrin, recentlyalleged that some state governors divert local government allocation to personal use.

Currently, all 36 states have independent election commissions which organise local government elections in the states.

However, elections for the area councils in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) are conducted by the Independent National Electoral Commission(INEC).

If the bill is passed, the state independent electoral commissions (SIEC) will be replaced by NILGEC.

Content of the bill

Establishment of NILGEC

According to the bill, the NILGEC will be an autonomous body to organise, oversee, and conduct elections for the offices of local government chairman and councillors in all 36 states and the FCT.

Functions and Powers

– To conduct free, fair, and transparent elections for Local Government Chairman and Councillors.

– To prepare and maintain an accurate and up-to-date voter register.

– To ensure voter education and public awareness regarding the electoral process.

– To set and enforce electoral guidelines and regulations for Local Government elections.

– To recruit and train electoral officers and staff for efficient election management.

– To monitor and supervise all electoral activities and processes.

– To investigate and adjudicate electoral disputes and grievances.

Composition of NILGEC

The bill says NILGEC shall consist of a chairperson and six commissioners, appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate.

The chairperson and commissioners shall serve for five years, renewable once.

Independence and Autonomy

NILGEC shall operate independently, free from external influence and interference.

The commission shall have its own budget, approved by the National Assembly, to ensure financial independence.

Electoral Process and Procedures

NILGEC shall develop and implement procedures for voter registration, candidate nomination, and the conduct of elections.

The commission shall ensure the provision of necessary electoral materials and logistics for the smooth conduct of elections.

Election Timeline

NILGEC shall announce the election schedule at least six months before the date of the election.

Elections for the offices of local government chairman and councillors shall be conducted every four years.

Electoral Offences and Penalties

NILGEC shall define and enforce penalties for electoral offences, including but not limited to voter fraud, ballot stuffing, and electoral violence.

Offenders shall be prosecuted and punished in accordance with the laws of the land.

Collaboration with Other Agencies

NILGEC shall collaborate with other relevant government agencies, security forces, and civil society organisations to ensure a secure and credible electoral process.

Transitional Provisions

Upon the establishment of NILGEC, all powers and functions related to the conduct of Local Government elections previously vested in any other body or authority shall be transferred to NILGEC.

Politics

Ndigbo are no longer spectators in the Nigerian project- Minister Dave Umahi dismisses calls for Biafra under Tinubu’s administration

Published

on

 

The Minister of Works, David Umahi, says the all-inclusive style of governance being practiced by President Bola Tinubu has made the agitation for Biafra an unnecessary clamour.

While speaking at the inspection of the Enugu-Anambra road last Saturday, December 13, Umahi said the Tinubu administration had given Ndigbo what they had sought for decades, not through secession, but through what he described as unprecedented inclusion in national governance and development.

He explained that the agitation for Biafra was historically driven by neglect, exclusion and underrepresentation at the federal level, but insisted that the situation had changed under the current administration.

“When a people are fully integrated, respected and empowered within the structure of the nation, the dream they once chased through agitation has already been achieved through cooperation.

The push for Biafran secession over the years was borne out of neglect, exclusion and underrepresentation but today the narrative has changed dramatically under President Bola Tinubu.

The President has deliberately opened the doors of national development to the South-East. Appointments, policy inputs and infrastructure priorities now reflect true federal balance.

Every sector now bears visible Igbo footprints. The emergence of Igbo sons and daughters in strategic positions is a testament to this inclusion.

Biafra was never about breaking Nigeria; it was about being counted in Nigeria. Through inclusion, equity and concrete development, Ndigbo are no longer spectators in the Nigerian project; they are co-authors of its future. When justice finds a people, agitation loses its voice.”he said

Continue Reading

Politics

ADC Launches 90-Day Membership Drive, Fixes Dates For Congresses, National Convention

Published

on

The African Democratic Congress (ADC) has announced a 90-day nationwide membership mobilisation, revalidation, and registration exercise as part of preparations for its internal party activities ahead of 2026.

The party also approved provisional dates for its congresses and the election of delegates at the polling unit, ward, and local government levels across the country.

In circulars issued by its national secretary, Rauf Aregbesola, the ADC said the congresses are expected to hold between January 20 and January 27, 2026.

The process, the party said, will lead to the emergence of delegates who will participate in its non-elective national convention scheduled for February 2026 in Abuja.

A statement by Bolaji Abdullahi, national publicity secretary of the party, said the decisions were reached at a meeting of the national working committee (NWC) held on November 27, 2025.

Abdullahi said the timetable and activities were approved in line with the resolutions of the NWC and in accordance with relevant provisions of the party’s constitution.

The ADC said further details on the membership exercise, congresses, and convention will be communicated to party members and stakeholders in due course.

Continue Reading

Politics

INVESTIGATION: Why No Imo Governor Ever Controls Succession- The Untold Story

Published

on

Imo State’s inability to sustain political succession from one elected governor to another is not accidental. It is the consequence of recurring structural failures rooted in elite conspiracy, federal power realignments, internal party implosions, zoning sensitivities, and the perennial arrogance of incumbency. From Achike Udenwa to Ikedi Ohakim and Rochas Okorocha, each administration fell victim to a combination of these forces, leaving behind a state where power is never inherited, only contested.

Achike Udenwa’s experience remains the most instructive example of how federal might and elite scheming can dismantle a governor’s succession plan. Governing between 1999 and 2007 under the PDP, Udenwa assumed that the party’s national dominance would guarantee internal cohesion in Imo. Instead, his tenure coincided with one of the most vicious intra-party wars the state has ever witnessed.

The Imo PDP split into two irreconcilable blocs. On one side was Udenwa’s grassroots-driven Onongono Group, powered by loyalists such as Alex Obi and anchored on local structures. On the other was a formidable Abuja faction populated by heavyweight figures including Kema Chikwe, Ifeanyi Araraume, Hope Uzodimma, Tony Ezenna, and others with direct access to federal influence. This was not a clash of personalities alone; it was a struggle over who controlled the levers of power beyond Owerri.

The conflict worsened when Udenwa openly aligned with then Vice President Atiku Abubakar during his bitter feud with President Olusegun Obasanjo. That alignment proved politically fatal. Obasanjo, determined to weaken Atiku’s network nationwide, withdrew federal support from governors perceived as loyal to the vice president. In Imo, the effect was immediate and devastating.

Federal agencies, party organs, and influence channels tilted decisively toward the Kema Chikwe-led Abuja faction. Udenwa lost effective control of the PDP structure, security leverage, and strategic influence. His foot soldiers in the Onongono Group could mobilise locally, but they could not withstand a coordinated assault backed by the centre.

His preferred successor, Charles Ugwu, never gained political altitude. By the time succession became imminent, Udenwa was already a governor without power. Even his later recalculations failed to reverse the tide. The party had slipped beyond his grasp.

The eventual outcome was politically ironic. Ikedi Ohakim emerged governor, backed by forces aligned with the federal establishment, notably Maurice Iwu—his kinsman and then Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Another Udenwa ally, Martin Agbaso, briefly tasted victory, only for his election to be cancelled. The lesson was brutal and unmistakable: without federal alignment, succession in Imo is almost impossible.

Notably, Udenwa’s record in office did not rescue him. Infrastructure development, relative stability, and administrative competence counted for little in the face of elite conspiracy operating simultaneously at state and federal levels. In Imo politics, performance is secondary to power alignment.

Ikedi Ohakim’s tenure presents a different dimension of failure. Unlike Udenwa, he never reached the point of succession planning. His administration was consumed by political survival. From 2007 to 2011, Ohakim governed amid persistent hostility from elites and a rapidly deteriorating public image.

Ohakim has consistently maintained that his downfall was orchestrated. Central to his claim is the allegation that he was blackmailed with a scandal involving the alleged assault of a Catholic priest, Reverend Father Eustace Eke. In a deeply religious state like Imo, the allegation was politically lethal.

Whether the claims were factual or exaggerated mattered less than their impact. The narrative overwhelmed governance, drowned out policy achievements, and turned public opinion sharply against him. Political elites who had midwifed his emergence quickly distanced themselves, sensing vulnerability.

By the 2011 election, Ohakim stood isolated. Party loyalty evaporated, elite cover disappeared, and voter sympathy collapsed. His re-election bid failed decisively. With that loss, any discussion of succession became irrelevant. His experience reinforces a core principle: a governor rejected by the electorate cannot dictate continuity.

*Uzodimma*

 

Rochas Okorocha’s rise in 2011 appeared to signal a break from Imo’s succession curse. Charismatic, populist, and financially powerful, he commanded party structures and grassroots loyalty. By his second term, he seemed politically unassailable.

Yet Okorocha committed the most consequential succession error in the state’s history. By attempting to impose his son-in-law, Uche Nwosu, as successor, he crossed from political strategy into dynastic ambition. That decision detonated his massive support base in the State overnight.

Imo’s political elites revolted almost unanimously. Party affiliation became secondary to a shared determination to stop what was widely perceived as an attempt to privatise public office. The revolt was elite-driven, strategic, and ruthless.

The zoning factor compounded the crisis. Okorocha hailed from Orlu zone; so did Nwosu. For many Imo voters, the prospect of Orlu retaining power through familial succession was unacceptable. What might have been tolerated as ambition became framed as entitlement.

This time, elite resistance aligned with popular sentiment. The electorate queued behind alternatives not necessarily out of conviction, but out of rejection. Crucially, Emeka Ihedioha emerged governor because Okorocha fatally miscalculated—splitting his base, provoking elite rebellion, and underestimating voter resentment. Okorocha’s formidable structure collapsed under internal rebellion and voter backlash, sealing his failure to produce a successor.

Hope Uzodimma’s current position must be assessed against this turbulent history. At present, the structural indicators are in his favour. He enjoys firm federal backing, controls the APC machinery in the state, and commands the support—or at least the compliance—of most major political elites.

Unlike Udenwa, Uzodimma is aligned with the centre. Unlike Ohakim, he has survived electoral tests. Unlike Okorocha, he has not openly flirted with dynastic politics. On the surface, the succession equation appears favorable.

*Udenwa*

 

However, Imo’s history cautions against certainty. Elite loyalty in the state is conditional and transactional. It endures only where interests are balanced, ambitions managed, and inclusion sustained. A wrong choice of successor could still provoke elite conspiracy, even if it emerges from within the ruling party.

The opposition remains weak and fragmented, with limited capacity to mobilize mass resistance. Yet voter apathy, now more pronounced than during the Udenwa and Okorocha eras, introduces a new risk. Disengaged electorates are unpredictable and often disruptive.

“Ohakim*

 

Ultimately, Uzodimma’s challenge is not opposition strength but elite psychology. Suppressed ambitions, if mishandled, can erupt. Succession in Imo has never been about coronation; it is about negotiation.

*Okorocha*

History is unforgiving to governors who confuse incumbency with ownership. Power in Imo is never transferred by decree. As 2027 approaches, the same forces that toppled past succession plans remain alive. Whether Uzodimma avoids their trap will depend not on power alone, but on restraint, balance, and political wisdom.

Continue Reading

Trending