Politics
Can China fill the gap as next US president tackles loss of influence in Middle East?
Analysts say both Donald Trump and Kamala Harris will have to come to terms with Beijing seeking a greater role as Washington loses sway
The presidential race between Donald Trump and Kamala Harris comes at a time of rising geopolitical tensions on multiple fronts. In the third of an in-depth series, Zhao Ziwen looks at how the election will affect Middle East policy and China-US rivalry in the region.
The widening conflict in the Middle East is one of the main issues dominating the current US debate about foreign policy, with the decision to send troops and advanced missile defences to Israel prompting Iran to warn that Washington is putting its own troops’ lives at risk.
It may even have a direct impact on the result of the presidential election with anger at the White House’s pro-Israel stance threatening Vice-President Kamala Harris’s prospects of taking Michigan, a key swing state that has a significant proportion of Arab-American voters.
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But many observers believe that no matter what the result, the next president will face the stark truth that US influence in the region will be increasingly limited and it will feel an increasing need to focus more resources on the Asia-Pacific and its growing rivalry with China.
However, Beijing’s growing role in the Middle East could also turn the region into another battleground in the US-China rivalry, potentially reshaping the contours of Washington’s foreign policy, according to experts.
John Calabrese, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, noted that the policy differences between a Donald Trump administration and a Harris administration might be smaller than many expect. He said that both would be constrained by the same reality: the narrowing scope of US influence in the region.
“The range of policy options available to the US in the Middle East has become narrower, and there is a clearer understanding of the limits of American influence,” Calabrese said.
“Addressing the war in Gaza, redefining relations with the Gulf Arab states, and managing Iran” will be the three main issues for the US, he added.
In the Republican Party’s 28-page platform, Trump’s vision of governance mentions the Middle East only twice, and with scant details. It calls for Washington to “stand with Israel” and “seek peace in the Middle East” but does not give any specifics.
Harris, for her part, has not released a comprehensive foreign policy outline. However, she has consistently emphasised support for Israel in her campaign while also voicing concerns about the plight of the Palestinians.
Despite the lack of clarity in their official platforms, the policies of both candidates align in key areas. Trump’s four years in office were marked by robust support for Israel, along with his administration’s “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran.
Harris is expected to continue US President Joe Biden’s approach to the Middle East: backing Israel while maintaining a focus on humanitarian aid for Palestinians, and working with regional partners to counter Iranian influence.
“A Trump administration will likely be based on a set-up that is more committed to Israeli positions, as evidenced by his 2020 peace plan and the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital,” said Clemens Chay, a research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute.
“Vice-President Kamala Harris has largely stuck to the [Biden] administration line, which has demonstrated a current lack of political will in Washington to restrain Israel.”
“Compounded by the fact that in an election year, the Biden administration’s room to operate is limited if he is to avoid exacerbating the domestic political impact of war,” Chay added.
“How a Harris administration would perhaps go further, from what is deemed at the moment a low baseline, is to achieve a ceasefire.”
Although both sides are likely to continue to support Israel, there is a growing consensus that Washington’s direct involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts – including the Israel-Gaza war – is becoming unsustainable.
Ahmed Aboudouh, an associate fellow at British think tank Chatham House and head of the China Studies unit at the Emirates Policy Centre in Abu Dhabi, suggested that the US would increasingly prioritise its competition with China in the Asia-Pacific region, reducing its direct engagement in the Middle East.
“In the long run, I still see the US recalibrating its posture in the region in a way that allows it to balance its strategic priorities towards keeping China in check in Asia and simultaneously maintaining the bare minimum security stability in the Middle East,” he said.
“This means reducing the cost of its involvement by shifting from a micromanagement approach to offshore balancing.”
Both the Trump and Biden administrations have played a role in this shift. Trump pulled the US out of the Iran nuclear deal, while Biden withdrew troops from Afghanistan.
This “offshore balancing” strategy has also been evident in Washington’s efforts to normalise relations between Israel and Arab states, particularly in the Persian Gulf region, to counter Iran’s influence.
The Abraham Accords, a landmark diplomatic achievement initiated during Trump’s presidency, were among the few foreign policy successes inherited by the Biden administration. However, the potential for a historic Saudi-Israeli normalisation deal has since stalled because of the Gaza conflict.
Aboudouh noted that the Israel-Gaza war and the rising hostilities between Israel and its neighbours had essentially closed the door on any significant US withdrawal from the region in the near future.
“As the war in Gaza and the regional escalation have taught since [Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel], the door for the US to exit the region is completely shut,” he said
“Washington is being taken captive by the region,” he said. “As much as the region has always been shaped by the US preferences. This means that withdrawing from the Middle East in a strategic sense is not on the table.”
Washington has stepped up its deployment in the region because of the Gaza war and its spillover into Iran and Lebanon. Biden was also directly involved in ceasefire negotiations for nearly a year, showing a political commitment that has not been seen in the region for years.
“It is unlikely the case where Washington will reduce its involvement in the Middle East in the near future, given the fact that the Pentagon has been extremely rapid in deploying its forces – naval, air, or otherwise – since the start of the Gaza war,” Chay said.
While Washington grapples with these challenges, China is stepping up its influence in the Middle East, positioning itself as a counterpoint to US dominance.
In addition to brokering a deal to resume diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran last year, China helped broker a unity deal among 14 Palestinian factions, including Hamas, in July.
Beijing’s diplomatic manoeuvring in the region has been aimed at positioning itself as a vital voice – particularly among Global South countries – in the Israel-Hamas conflict.
“China has shown it is ready to challenge the US position in the region. The Gaza conflict has been the biggest opportunity since [Chinese President] Xi Jinping came to power to do so,” Aboudouh said.
“Beijing could skilfully undermine Washington’s credibility and image across the Global South by siding with the Palestinians and consistently demanding a ceasefire,” he added.
Calabrese said that a major battleground in the rivalry between Beijing and Washington could be the Gulf region, given China’s cooperation with US allies there.
This is especially true of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, whose cooperation with China in sensitive hi-tech and military fields is viewed by Washington as an unprecedented risk.
“Washington will closely monitor China’s engagement in the Gulf, particularly efforts to prevent Beijing from establishing a military presence or making advances in artificial intelligence and other critical technologies,” Calabrese said.
“Success in this area will depend on the US’ ability to strengthen its security and tech commitments to offset Gulf states’ growing ties with China.”
China’s growing influence in Iran – Washington’s biggest regional enemy – is also being closely watched by the West.
Since the Israel-Gaza war started, Beijing – the biggest buyer of Iranian oil – has maintained close communication with Tehran on regional issues ranging from the Red Sea crisis to Israel’s strikes against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
According to Calabrese, Washington insiders – and especially Trump’s supporters – still believe that “Iran is central to all the challenges facing American interests in the Middle East”.
“These voices will likely push for tighter sanctions enforcement and a stronger retaliatory stance against actions by Iran and its proxies,” he added.
Some observers noted there was still a gap between Beijing’s aspirations and its capabilities.
Chay said that while China’s competition with Washington in the Middle East was largely economic, its willingness to become an active regional mediator remained limited.
“Beijing’s activist approach has been largely constrained to small diplomatic wins,” he said.
“But when it comes to taking on significant security or mediation roles, there is a lack of political will to intervene at the scale the US has historically done.”
Aboudouh agreed, pointing out that Beijing’s moves were primarily aimed at undermining Washington’s standing in the region, without shouldering the same security responsibility or diplomatic costs.
“China’s strategy is to position itself as an alternative to the US, but without engaging in the heavy lifting required to de-escalate regional tensions,” he said.
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Ndigbo are no longer spectators in the Nigerian project- Minister Dave Umahi dismisses calls for Biafra under Tinubu’s administration
The Minister of Works, David Umahi, says the all-inclusive style of governance being practiced by President Bola Tinubu has made the agitation for Biafra an unnecessary clamour.
While speaking at the inspection of the Enugu-Anambra road last Saturday, December 13, Umahi said the Tinubu administration had given Ndigbo what they had sought for decades, not through secession, but through what he described as unprecedented inclusion in national governance and development.
He explained that the agitation for Biafra was historically driven by neglect, exclusion and underrepresentation at the federal level, but insisted that the situation had changed under the current administration.
“When a people are fully integrated, respected and empowered within the structure of the nation, the dream they once chased through agitation has already been achieved through cooperation.
The push for Biafran secession over the years was borne out of neglect, exclusion and underrepresentation but today the narrative has changed dramatically under President Bola Tinubu.
The President has deliberately opened the doors of national development to the South-East. Appointments, policy inputs and infrastructure priorities now reflect true federal balance.
Every sector now bears visible Igbo footprints. The emergence of Igbo sons and daughters in strategic positions is a testament to this inclusion.
Biafra was never about breaking Nigeria; it was about being counted in Nigeria. Through inclusion, equity and concrete development, Ndigbo are no longer spectators in the Nigerian project; they are co-authors of its future. When justice finds a people, agitation loses its voice.”he said
Politics
ADC Launches 90-Day Membership Drive, Fixes Dates For Congresses, National Convention
The African Democratic Congress (ADC) has announced a 90-day nationwide membership mobilisation, revalidation, and registration exercise as part of preparations for its internal party activities ahead of 2026.
The party also approved provisional dates for its congresses and the election of delegates at the polling unit, ward, and local government levels across the country.
In circulars issued by its national secretary, Rauf Aregbesola, the ADC said the congresses are expected to hold between January 20 and January 27, 2026.
The process, the party said, will lead to the emergence of delegates who will participate in its non-elective national convention scheduled for February 2026 in Abuja.
A statement by Bolaji Abdullahi, national publicity secretary of the party, said the decisions were reached at a meeting of the national working committee (NWC) held on November 27, 2025.
Abdullahi said the timetable and activities were approved in line with the resolutions of the NWC and in accordance with relevant provisions of the party’s constitution.
The ADC said further details on the membership exercise, congresses, and convention will be communicated to party members and stakeholders in due course.
Politics
INVESTIGATION: Why No Imo Governor Ever Controls Succession- The Untold Story
Imo State’s inability to sustain political succession from one elected governor to another is not accidental. It is the consequence of recurring structural failures rooted in elite conspiracy, federal power realignments, internal party implosions, zoning sensitivities, and the perennial arrogance of incumbency. From Achike Udenwa to Ikedi Ohakim and Rochas Okorocha, each administration fell victim to a combination of these forces, leaving behind a state where power is never inherited, only contested.
Achike Udenwa’s experience remains the most instructive example of how federal might and elite scheming can dismantle a governor’s succession plan. Governing between 1999 and 2007 under the PDP, Udenwa assumed that the party’s national dominance would guarantee internal cohesion in Imo. Instead, his tenure coincided with one of the most vicious intra-party wars the state has ever witnessed.
The Imo PDP split into two irreconcilable blocs. On one side was Udenwa’s grassroots-driven Onongono Group, powered by loyalists such as Alex Obi and anchored on local structures. On the other was a formidable Abuja faction populated by heavyweight figures including Kema Chikwe, Ifeanyi Araraume, Hope Uzodimma, Tony Ezenna, and others with direct access to federal influence. This was not a clash of personalities alone; it was a struggle over who controlled the levers of power beyond Owerri.
The conflict worsened when Udenwa openly aligned with then Vice President Atiku Abubakar during his bitter feud with President Olusegun Obasanjo. That alignment proved politically fatal. Obasanjo, determined to weaken Atiku’s network nationwide, withdrew federal support from governors perceived as loyal to the vice president. In Imo, the effect was immediate and devastating.
Federal agencies, party organs, and influence channels tilted decisively toward the Kema Chikwe-led Abuja faction. Udenwa lost effective control of the PDP structure, security leverage, and strategic influence. His foot soldiers in the Onongono Group could mobilise locally, but they could not withstand a coordinated assault backed by the centre.
His preferred successor, Charles Ugwu, never gained political altitude. By the time succession became imminent, Udenwa was already a governor without power. Even his later recalculations failed to reverse the tide. The party had slipped beyond his grasp.
The eventual outcome was politically ironic. Ikedi Ohakim emerged governor, backed by forces aligned with the federal establishment, notably Maurice Iwu—his kinsman and then Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Another Udenwa ally, Martin Agbaso, briefly tasted victory, only for his election to be cancelled. The lesson was brutal and unmistakable: without federal alignment, succession in Imo is almost impossible.
Notably, Udenwa’s record in office did not rescue him. Infrastructure development, relative stability, and administrative competence counted for little in the face of elite conspiracy operating simultaneously at state and federal levels. In Imo politics, performance is secondary to power alignment.
Ikedi Ohakim’s tenure presents a different dimension of failure. Unlike Udenwa, he never reached the point of succession planning. His administration was consumed by political survival. From 2007 to 2011, Ohakim governed amid persistent hostility from elites and a rapidly deteriorating public image.
Ohakim has consistently maintained that his downfall was orchestrated. Central to his claim is the allegation that he was blackmailed with a scandal involving the alleged assault of a Catholic priest, Reverend Father Eustace Eke. In a deeply religious state like Imo, the allegation was politically lethal.
Whether the claims were factual or exaggerated mattered less than their impact. The narrative overwhelmed governance, drowned out policy achievements, and turned public opinion sharply against him. Political elites who had midwifed his emergence quickly distanced themselves, sensing vulnerability.
By the 2011 election, Ohakim stood isolated. Party loyalty evaporated, elite cover disappeared, and voter sympathy collapsed. His re-election bid failed decisively. With that loss, any discussion of succession became irrelevant. His experience reinforces a core principle: a governor rejected by the electorate cannot dictate continuity.

*Uzodimma*
Rochas Okorocha’s rise in 2011 appeared to signal a break from Imo’s succession curse. Charismatic, populist, and financially powerful, he commanded party structures and grassroots loyalty. By his second term, he seemed politically unassailable.
Yet Okorocha committed the most consequential succession error in the state’s history. By attempting to impose his son-in-law, Uche Nwosu, as successor, he crossed from political strategy into dynastic ambition. That decision detonated his massive support base in the State overnight.
Imo’s political elites revolted almost unanimously. Party affiliation became secondary to a shared determination to stop what was widely perceived as an attempt to privatise public office. The revolt was elite-driven, strategic, and ruthless.
The zoning factor compounded the crisis. Okorocha hailed from Orlu zone; so did Nwosu. For many Imo voters, the prospect of Orlu retaining power through familial succession was unacceptable. What might have been tolerated as ambition became framed as entitlement.
This time, elite resistance aligned with popular sentiment. The electorate queued behind alternatives not necessarily out of conviction, but out of rejection. Crucially, Emeka Ihedioha emerged governor because Okorocha fatally miscalculated—splitting his base, provoking elite rebellion, and underestimating voter resentment. Okorocha’s formidable structure collapsed under internal rebellion and voter backlash, sealing his failure to produce a successor.
Hope Uzodimma’s current position must be assessed against this turbulent history. At present, the structural indicators are in his favour. He enjoys firm federal backing, controls the APC machinery in the state, and commands the support—or at least the compliance—of most major political elites.
Unlike Udenwa, Uzodimma is aligned with the centre. Unlike Ohakim, he has survived electoral tests. Unlike Okorocha, he has not openly flirted with dynastic politics. On the surface, the succession equation appears favorable.

*Udenwa*
However, Imo’s history cautions against certainty. Elite loyalty in the state is conditional and transactional. It endures only where interests are balanced, ambitions managed, and inclusion sustained. A wrong choice of successor could still provoke elite conspiracy, even if it emerges from within the ruling party.
The opposition remains weak and fragmented, with limited capacity to mobilize mass resistance. Yet voter apathy, now more pronounced than during the Udenwa and Okorocha eras, introduces a new risk. Disengaged electorates are unpredictable and often disruptive.

“Ohakim*
Ultimately, Uzodimma’s challenge is not opposition strength but elite psychology. Suppressed ambitions, if mishandled, can erupt. Succession in Imo has never been about coronation; it is about negotiation.

*Okorocha*
History is unforgiving to governors who confuse incumbency with ownership. Power in Imo is never transferred by decree. As 2027 approaches, the same forces that toppled past succession plans remain alive. Whether Uzodimma avoids their trap will depend not on power alone, but on restraint, balance, and political wisdom.
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