El-Rufai sues ICPC over validity of search warrant

Following the 19th February 2026 search of his residence by officials of the ICPC, Malam Nasir El-Rufai has asked a Federal High Court to declare the search warrant as invalid. The case, which seeks the enforcement of his fundamental rights, named as respondents the ICPC, the Chief Magistrate of the FCT, the Inspector-General of Police and the Attorney-General of the Federation.

The case is seeking a declaration:
• That the search warrant is invalid, for lack of particularity, material drafting errors, ambiguity in execution parameters, overbreadth and lack of probable cause.

• The invasion and search of his residence based on an invalid search warrant amounts to a gross violation of his fundamental human rights to dignity of the human person, personal liberty, fair hearing and privacy under Sections 34, 35, 36 and 37 of the Constitution.

• Any evidence obtained pursuant to the invalid warrant and unlawful search is not admissible in any proceedings against him as it was obtained in breach of constitutional safeguards.

Malam El-Rufai is also seeking an injunction restraining the respondents from using or tendering any evidence or items seized during unlawful search in any proceedings involving him. He is seeking an order for the return of all items obtained during the search, and an order for various damages.

According to the court filing “the search warrant is fundamentally defective, lacking specificity in the description of items to be seized, containing material typographical errors, ambiguous execution terms, overbroad directives, and no verifiable probable cause, in contravention of Sections 143-148 of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 (ACJA), Section 36 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 (ICPC Act), an constitutional protections against arbitrary intrusions. “

Malam El-Rufai’s lawyers contend that:
• Section 143 of the ACJA requires that an application for a search warrant be supported by information in writing and on oath, setting forth reasonable grounds for suspicion, which was absent here as evidenced by the incomplete initiating clause;

• Section 144 mandates particular descriptions of the place to be searched and the items sought, to prevent general warrants, yet the warrant vaguely refers to “the thing aforesaid” without any detail;

• Section 146 stipulates that the warrant must be in the prescribed form, free from defects that could mislead, but the document is riddled with errors in the address, date, and district designation;

• Section 147 allows direction to specified persons, but the warrant’s indiscriminate addressing to “all” officers is overbroad and unaccountable;

• Section 148 permits execution at reasonable times, but the contradictory language creates ambiguity, undermining procedural clarity.

Signed
Muyiwa Adekeye
Media Adviser
23rd February 2026