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INEC Chairman, Prof. Mahmood Yakubu and members of the Commission, meet with Media Organizations at the ongoing quarterly consultative meeting in Abuja, ahead of the 2024 Edo and Ondo States Governorship Elections on Wednesday, May 15th, 2024.

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The President of the Nigeria Union of Journalists
President and Council Members of the NIPR
Senior Officials of the Nigerian Guild of Editors
Executive Director of the International Press Centre (IPC)
Media Executives and Heads of Various Media Organisations
Editors and Senior Journalists
National Commissioners of INEC
The Secretary and Other Senior Officials of the Commission
Members of the INEC Press Corps
Ladies and Gentlemen

1. It is my pleasure to welcome you all to our second regular quarterly consultative meeting for this year. You may recall that our first meeting for the year was held about two months ago on Thursday 21st March 2024 at which we briefed you about the 9 bye-elections and 38 re-run elections in 26 States of the Federation held on 3rd February 2024. We would like to further inform you that with the exception of two State Assembly constituencies in Enugu and Kano States disrupted by violence and thuggery, winners have emerged in 45 out of 47 constituencies. Following extensive consultation with stakeholders in the two States, the Commission is remobilising to conclude the outstanding re-run elections in Enugu South 1 State Constituency of Enugu State and Ghari (formerly known as Kunchi Local Government Area) for the Ghari/Tsanyawa State Constituency of Kano State. We similarly briefed you on the forthcoming off-cycle Governorship elections in Edo and Ondo States.

2. Early this week, the Commission announced the plan to resume the Continuous Voter Registration (CVR) as part of our preparations for the Edo and Ondo State Governorship elections. As you are aware, the Edo State Governorship election is holding in the next four months on Saturday 21st September 2024 while the Ondo Governorship election holds in the next six months on Saturday 16th November 2024.

3. The Continuous Voter Registration (CVR) in the two States will enable eligible citizens who are not registered voters to do so. Similarly, registered voters also have the opportunity to transfer their registration from other States of the Federation to Edo and Ondo States or from one location to another within the States. Lost or damaged voters’ cards will be replaced during the exercise. The CVR will take place simultaneously in the two States from Monday 27th May 2024 to Wednesday 5th June 2024 from 9.00am to 3.00pm daily including the weekend. Let me reiterate that the CVR is only open to new registrants and those who seek to transfer their registration. Persons who are registered as voters should not attempt to register again as double or multiple registration is illegal.

4. Taking into consideration the limited time to the Governorship elections, the Commission has decided to conduct the registration at Ward level and our State headquarters instead of our Local Government offices and a few designated centers as was the case in the past. This means that there will be 192 Ward registration centres in Edo State and 203 centres in Ondo State in addition to our State offices in Benin City and Akure, making a total of 397 walk-in registration centres in the two States. There will be no online pre-registration option in the two States because of time constraint. Each centre will be managed by two officials drawn from our regular staff and the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC). In the next few days, the Commission will commence the training of at least 794 officials for the exercise. The locations of the registration centres as well as other relevant information have been compiled in a detailed 28-page document included in your folders for this meeting. The same information has already been uploaded to our website and social media platforms for public information.

5. The Commission therefore appeals to the media to join us in mobilising prospective registrants for the exercise, particularly on the need to register early and not wait until the deadline approaches when the registration centres will be inundated by eleventh hour registrants.

6. In addition to the registration of voters, the Commission will also make available the uncollected Permanent Voters’ Cards (PVCs) for collection during the CVR. In the coming days, the list of uncollected PVCs will be published in our offices in the two States and simultaneously uploaded to our website. We believe that doing so will make it easier for voters to know the availability of the cards and identify the locations to collect them. However, no PVCs will be collected by proxy. Registered voters should come in person to collect their cards. Again, we seek for the support of the media in encouraging voters to locate and pick up thier PVCs as was done in the past.

7. Still on our preparations for the two Governorship elections, the Commission has published the final list of candidates for Edo following the conclusion of party primaries and the end of the period for withdrawal and substitution of candidates as provided in the Timetable and Schedule of Activities for the election. Campaign in public by political parties commenced on Wednesday 24th April 2024 and will end at midnight on Thursday 19th September 2024 i.e. 24 hours before the date fixed for the election as provided by law. We look forward reading your monitoring reports of the campaigns as some of you have done in the past.

8. As we move closer to Election Day in Edo State, it is also imperative to request media organisations to submit applications for accreditation to report on the election in earnest along with the required documentation for individual journalists and support staff. Doing so will enable the Commission to produce and deliver the identity cards for journalists covering the election in good time. The Commission will not entertain requests outside the deadline for the receipt of applications from interested media organisations or process requests that do not meet the criteria for accreditation.

9. Turning to outstanding bye-elections, the Commission would like to inform you about the existence of vacancies in four States of the Federation involving three State Assembly constituencies and one Federal Constituency as a result of death or resignation of Honourable Members. As soon as preparations are concluded, the Commission will announce the dates for bye-elections in Khana 2 State Constituency of Rivers State, the Bagwai/Shanono State constituency of Kano State, the Zaria Kewaye State Constituency of Kaduna State and the Garki/Babura Federal Constituency of Jigawa State.

10. On this note, I once again welcome you all to this meeting. I thank you and God bless.

Politics

INVESTIGATION: Why No Imo Governor Ever Controls Succession- The Untold Story

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Imo State’s inability to sustain political succession from one elected governor to another is not accidental. It is the consequence of recurring structural failures rooted in elite conspiracy, federal power realignments, internal party implosions, zoning sensitivities, and the perennial arrogance of incumbency. From Achike Udenwa to Ikedi Ohakim and Rochas Okorocha, each administration fell victim to a combination of these forces, leaving behind a state where power is never inherited, only contested.

Achike Udenwa’s experience remains the most instructive example of how federal might and elite scheming can dismantle a governor’s succession plan. Governing between 1999 and 2007 under the PDP, Udenwa assumed that the party’s national dominance would guarantee internal cohesion in Imo. Instead, his tenure coincided with one of the most vicious intra-party wars the state has ever witnessed.

The Imo PDP split into two irreconcilable blocs. On one side was Udenwa’s grassroots-driven Onongono Group, powered by loyalists such as Alex Obi and anchored on local structures. On the other was a formidable Abuja faction populated by heavyweight figures including Kema Chikwe, Ifeanyi Araraume, Hope Uzodimma, Tony Ezenna, and others with direct access to federal influence. This was not a clash of personalities alone; it was a struggle over who controlled the levers of power beyond Owerri.

The conflict worsened when Udenwa openly aligned with then Vice President Atiku Abubakar during his bitter feud with President Olusegun Obasanjo. That alignment proved politically fatal. Obasanjo, determined to weaken Atiku’s network nationwide, withdrew federal support from governors perceived as loyal to the vice president. In Imo, the effect was immediate and devastating.

Federal agencies, party organs, and influence channels tilted decisively toward the Kema Chikwe-led Abuja faction. Udenwa lost effective control of the PDP structure, security leverage, and strategic influence. His foot soldiers in the Onongono Group could mobilise locally, but they could not withstand a coordinated assault backed by the centre.

His preferred successor, Charles Ugwu, never gained political altitude. By the time succession became imminent, Udenwa was already a governor without power. Even his later recalculations failed to reverse the tide. The party had slipped beyond his grasp.

The eventual outcome was politically ironic. Ikedi Ohakim emerged governor, backed by forces aligned with the federal establishment, notably Maurice Iwu—his kinsman and then Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Another Udenwa ally, Martin Agbaso, briefly tasted victory, only for his election to be cancelled. The lesson was brutal and unmistakable: without federal alignment, succession in Imo is almost impossible.

Notably, Udenwa’s record in office did not rescue him. Infrastructure development, relative stability, and administrative competence counted for little in the face of elite conspiracy operating simultaneously at state and federal levels. In Imo politics, performance is secondary to power alignment.

Ikedi Ohakim’s tenure presents a different dimension of failure. Unlike Udenwa, he never reached the point of succession planning. His administration was consumed by political survival. From 2007 to 2011, Ohakim governed amid persistent hostility from elites and a rapidly deteriorating public image.

Ohakim has consistently maintained that his downfall was orchestrated. Central to his claim is the allegation that he was blackmailed with a scandal involving the alleged assault of a Catholic priest, Reverend Father Eustace Eke. In a deeply religious state like Imo, the allegation was politically lethal.

Whether the claims were factual or exaggerated mattered less than their impact. The narrative overwhelmed governance, drowned out policy achievements, and turned public opinion sharply against him. Political elites who had midwifed his emergence quickly distanced themselves, sensing vulnerability.

By the 2011 election, Ohakim stood isolated. Party loyalty evaporated, elite cover disappeared, and voter sympathy collapsed. His re-election bid failed decisively. With that loss, any discussion of succession became irrelevant. His experience reinforces a core principle: a governor rejected by the electorate cannot dictate continuity.

*Uzodimma*

 

Rochas Okorocha’s rise in 2011 appeared to signal a break from Imo’s succession curse. Charismatic, populist, and financially powerful, he commanded party structures and grassroots loyalty. By his second term, he seemed politically unassailable.

Yet Okorocha committed the most consequential succession error in the state’s history. By attempting to impose his son-in-law, Uche Nwosu, as successor, he crossed from political strategy into dynastic ambition. That decision detonated his massive support base in the State overnight.

Imo’s political elites revolted almost unanimously. Party affiliation became secondary to a shared determination to stop what was widely perceived as an attempt to privatise public office. The revolt was elite-driven, strategic, and ruthless.

The zoning factor compounded the crisis. Okorocha hailed from Orlu zone; so did Nwosu. For many Imo voters, the prospect of Orlu retaining power through familial succession was unacceptable. What might have been tolerated as ambition became framed as entitlement.

This time, elite resistance aligned with popular sentiment. The electorate queued behind alternatives not necessarily out of conviction, but out of rejection. Crucially, Emeka Ihedioha emerged governor because Okorocha fatally miscalculated—splitting his base, provoking elite rebellion, and underestimating voter resentment. Okorocha’s formidable structure collapsed under internal rebellion and voter backlash, sealing his failure to produce a successor.

Hope Uzodimma’s current position must be assessed against this turbulent history. At present, the structural indicators are in his favour. He enjoys firm federal backing, controls the APC machinery in the state, and commands the support—or at least the compliance—of most major political elites.

Unlike Udenwa, Uzodimma is aligned with the centre. Unlike Ohakim, he has survived electoral tests. Unlike Okorocha, he has not openly flirted with dynastic politics. On the surface, the succession equation appears favorable.

*Udenwa*

 

However, Imo’s history cautions against certainty. Elite loyalty in the state is conditional and transactional. It endures only where interests are balanced, ambitions managed, and inclusion sustained. A wrong choice of successor could still provoke elite conspiracy, even if it emerges from within the ruling party.

The opposition remains weak and fragmented, with limited capacity to mobilize mass resistance. Yet voter apathy, now more pronounced than during the Udenwa and Okorocha eras, introduces a new risk. Disengaged electorates are unpredictable and often disruptive.

“Ohakim*

 

Ultimately, Uzodimma’s challenge is not opposition strength but elite psychology. Suppressed ambitions, if mishandled, can erupt. Succession in Imo has never been about coronation; it is about negotiation.

*Okorocha*

History is unforgiving to governors who confuse incumbency with ownership. Power in Imo is never transferred by decree. As 2027 approaches, the same forces that toppled past succession plans remain alive. Whether Uzodimma avoids their trap will depend not on power alone, but on restraint, balance, and political wisdom.

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Politics

Accord Party Crisis Deepens As Another Governorship Candidate Emerges For Osun Polls

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A faction of Accord Party has held its own governorship primary, where Mr. Clement Bamigbola emerged as the faction’s governorship candidate for the 2026 Osun State election.

This is coming just four days after the emergence of Governor Ademola Adeleke as the party’s flag-bearer.

Recall that the party under the leadership of Maxwell Mgbudem, on Wednesday, held a similar exercise which produced Governor Ademola Adeleke as the party’s candidate.

However, a faction of the party rejected his emergence, insisting that Barrister Maxwell Mgbudem is not the legally recognized national chairman of the Accord Party.

In a fresh development on Sunday, about 300 delegates of the Accord Party from across Osun State elected Bamigbola as the factional candidate during a primary held at Regina Suite, Osogbo.

Bamigbola emerged through a voice vote conducted by the delegates, after which the Chairman of the Primary Committee, Hon. Olufemi Ogundare, declared him the party’s candidate for the 2026 Osun State governorship election.

 

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Tinubu, ECOWAS leaders meet in Abuja over Benin coup, regional stability

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President Bola Tinubu and leaders of ECOWAS countries are currently meeting in Abuja.

The 68th Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government is taking place at the State House Conference Centre, in Abuja.

Leaders of West African countries at the meeting include President Julius Bio (Sierra Leone, ECOWAS Chair), President Patrice Talon (Benin), José Maria Neves (Cabo Verde) and Alassane Ouattara (Côte d’Ivoire).

Others are Adama Barrow (The Gambia), John Mahama (Ghana), Umaro Embaló (Guinea-Bissau), Joseph Boakai (Liberia), Bassirou Faye (Senegal) and Faure Gnassingbé (Togo).

The meeting is coming against the backdrop of five turbulent years for West Africa, which saw coups in Mali (2020, 2021), Burkina Faso (twice in 2022), and Niger (2023).

The latest incidents include an attempted coup in Benin on December 7, 2025, and renewed instability in Guinea-Bissau.

At the time of filing this report, details of the meeting are yet to be disclosed.

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