Politics
INTERNATIONAL VIEW – As Trump fights to acquire Greenland, the island’s population assesses its options
Story by Andreas Ernst, Marco Kauffmann Bossart, Andreas Rüesch
Perhaps some had doubted his sincerity on the matter. But U.S. President Donald Trump made his intentions clear right at the start of his second term of office: The U.S. is laying claim to Greenland. That is the best solution, Trump said. The U.S. would «get» Greenland, he told reporters. But how? Under international law, the island is an autonomous territory of the Kingdom of Denmark. The president wants to change this: If Copenhagen refuses to sell the resource-rich island, he wants to levy punitive tariffs against the trading nation. Nor has Trump ruled out military pressure. Meanwhile, the Greenlanders are pursuing their own plans.
1. What scenarios are under discussion?
a) Independence
By taking this path, Greenland would give up its status as a largely autonomous region within the Danish kingdom and declare itself to be independent state. Up to today, Copenhagen has determined Greenland’s foreign and defense policy.
b) Integration into the U.S.
In this case, Trump would facilitate the integration of Greenland into the United States. However, in a treaty signed in 1951, the U.S. government pledged to respect Danish sovereignty over Greenland. At the same time, Copenhagen agreed to allow Washington to use the Arctic island for military purposes.
c) Remaining part of the Danish kingdom
Under the status quo, Denmark provides annual transfer payments of around €500 million for the island, which has been largely autonomous since 1979. These subsidies finance around half of the island’s government budget.
d) Loose connection to Denmark
Greenland could emancipate itself more strongly from Denmark. A loose connection between the two is conceivable, similar to the relationship between the United States and the Pacific states of Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands. The three countries are formally independent, but their foreign and security policies are codetermined by Washington. In return, citizens of the three microstates are allowed to work and settle in the United States.
2. How could Greenland be separated from Denmark?
As a first step, Greenland’s 57,000 residents would have to vote in favor of independence from Denmark. Copenhagen has agreed to accept such a verdict. However, Denmark’s population and parliament would also have to approve a withdrawal agreement of this kind.
The so-called Statute of Autonomy of 2009 states that Greenland has the right to seek independence. In 2023, a commission of experts appointed by the government in Nuuk presented a draft constitution outlining the institutional framework for an independent Greenland.
3. What is Greenland’s position on these scenarios?
In a recent survey of Greenland residents jointly conducted by the newspapers Sermitsiaq (Greenland) and Berlingske (Denmark), 85% of respondents were against Greenland becoming part of the United States. Previous surveys have shown that a majority are in favor of independence – provided, however, that Greenland is able to stand on its own two feet economically.
In his latest New Year’s speech, Greenland’s Prime Minister Mute Egede called for the island to shake off the «shackles of colonialism.» The status quo is not an option, he said. However, Egede has also rejected a future under U.S. control: «We don’t want to be Danes or Americans, we want to be Greenlanders,» he said. Many Greenlanders are critical of efforts to exploit their raw materials. This is likely to contribute to their mistrust of Trump’s plans.

Playing in the eternal snow: Almost 80% of the island is covered by an ice sheet. However, global warming is causing the ice to melt at record speed. Reda / UIG / Getty
4. What is Denmark doing to keep Greenland?
The Danish government has emphasized that it is up to Greenland to determine its own future. However, it is clear that Copenhagen is eagerly catering to Greenlanders’ sensitivities in response to Trump’s threats. It transfers between 400 million and 500 million euros a year to Nuuk, which roughly corresponds to between one-third and one-half of Greenland’s budget. At the end of January, the Danish government additionally presented a comprehensive action plan aimed at combating discrimination against Greenlanders living in Denmark.
Denmark has also been forced to admit that it has badly neglected the military protection of Greenland in recent years. The four frigates patrolling the waters off the world’s largest island are said to be so decrepit that they frequently break down. To reduce maintenance costs, their sonar systems for detecting submarines have been removed. Copenhagen is now promising new investments totaling the equivalent of 1.8 billion Swiss francs (a bit under $2 billion). The government’s plans also include the procurement of new naval vessels and long-range drones, as well as the modernization of airports so as to enable the deployment of F-35 fighter jets.

A Danish frigate off the coast of Greenland. Denmark has announced new investments to improve the island’s military protection. Ida Marie Odgaard / Scanpix / Reuters
5. Does the EU have a say if Greenland decides to secede?
Only indirectly. Greenland’s relationship with the EU is complicated. The island became an integral part of Denmark only in 1953. It previously held the status of a colony. Twenty years afterward, following a referendum in 1973, Denmark joined the European Economic Community (a precursor to the EU). However, the vast majority of Greenlanders voted against this step in the referendum. Greenland itself left the EEC in 1985, having previously wrested the right to self-government from Copenhagen. Since that time, the island has been a special territory for the EU with privileged access to the single market. Its citizens are both Danish and EU citizens.
Nevertheless, the EU will not automatically intervene in a potential secession process. Brussels’ involvement would be possible if secession harmed the interests of Denmark as an EU member state, or if the act jeopardized the stability of Denmark or of the EU as a whole. This might be conceivable in the case of a unilateral or even disputed secession. The Self-Government Act of 2009 requires negotiations on the path to state independence – thus, any separation is meant to take place by mutual agreement. A sovereign Republic of Greenland could then seek new bilateral agreements with the EU.
6. Why is Trump insisting on acquiring the island?
As yet, Trump has not been put off by the negative reactions to his demand. In his very first week in office, he spoke to Denmark’s prime minister on the phone. According to unofficial sources, the conversation was confrontational and aggressive. Trump has not publicly explained exactly why he is so eager to own Greenland. He has simply presented it as a necessity, citing his country’s national interest.
Trump’s supporters point to the strategic location of the island, which lies on the most direct route between Russia and the United States, and serves as a kind of bulwark in front of North America. As a result of climate change, shipping routes that are currently blocked by ice are also likely to open up in the future. On the other hand, Greenland’s raw materials, including zinc, gold, copper and especially rare earths, make the island highly attractive. Rich deposits of oil and gas are also believed to lie under the ice sheet.
Experts argue that the U.S. does not need to own the island in order to protect its strategic interests there. Denmark, a close ally, has allowed the U.S. to maintain a military presence on the island since the 1950s, including at the Pituffik military base, which is important for the early detection of missile launches. Denmark has also prevented major investments from China in Greenland at the request of the United States.

The U.S. military base at Pituffik in the north of Greenland is important for the early detection of missile launches. Thomas Traasdahl / Scanpix / Reuters
7. How would Greenland become part of the U.S.?
Trump has not gone into detail on this issue, but has spoken only of «ownership and control.» Some supporters have raised the possibility of making Greenland the 51st state of America. However, this scenario is extremely unlikely. Traditionally, the U.S. has seen little reason to upgrade overseas territories to full states. The only exception to this has been Hawaii, which became the 50th state in 1959, gaining statehood at the same time as Alaska. For the previous 60 years, Hawaii had held only the quasi-colonial status of a «territory.»
Apart from a few uninhabited islands, the U.S. currently has five such territories: two in the Caribbean and three in the Pacific. Unlike the 50 states, overseas territories lack sovereignty of their own, and do not have voting representation in Congress. In most cases, however, their residents are granted American citizenship. The largest territory is the island of Puerto Rico, whose population of 3.2 million is more than that of 18 U.S. states. Nevertheless, many years of efforts to upgrade Puerto Rico’s status have come to naught.
Greenland, with its tiny population of just 57,000, has no realistic chance of becoming the 51st state of the U.S. even if its population wanted this outcome – in part because this would also mean granting the island two senatorial seats and one seat in the House of Representatives, which would amount to a blatant overrepresentation in Congress. If Trump were to incorporate the area into the U.S., Greenlanders would therefore have to adjust to the role of second-class citizens living in a mere territory – which may make the prospect of changing nationality even less attractive.
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Politics
Ndigbo are no longer spectators in the Nigerian project- Minister Dave Umahi dismisses calls for Biafra under Tinubu’s administration
The Minister of Works, David Umahi, says the all-inclusive style of governance being practiced by President Bola Tinubu has made the agitation for Biafra an unnecessary clamour.
While speaking at the inspection of the Enugu-Anambra road last Saturday, December 13, Umahi said the Tinubu administration had given Ndigbo what they had sought for decades, not through secession, but through what he described as unprecedented inclusion in national governance and development.
He explained that the agitation for Biafra was historically driven by neglect, exclusion and underrepresentation at the federal level, but insisted that the situation had changed under the current administration.
“When a people are fully integrated, respected and empowered within the structure of the nation, the dream they once chased through agitation has already been achieved through cooperation.
The push for Biafran secession over the years was borne out of neglect, exclusion and underrepresentation but today the narrative has changed dramatically under President Bola Tinubu.
The President has deliberately opened the doors of national development to the South-East. Appointments, policy inputs and infrastructure priorities now reflect true federal balance.
Every sector now bears visible Igbo footprints. The emergence of Igbo sons and daughters in strategic positions is a testament to this inclusion.
Biafra was never about breaking Nigeria; it was about being counted in Nigeria. Through inclusion, equity and concrete development, Ndigbo are no longer spectators in the Nigerian project; they are co-authors of its future. When justice finds a people, agitation loses its voice.”he said
Politics
ADC Launches 90-Day Membership Drive, Fixes Dates For Congresses, National Convention
The African Democratic Congress (ADC) has announced a 90-day nationwide membership mobilisation, revalidation, and registration exercise as part of preparations for its internal party activities ahead of 2026.
The party also approved provisional dates for its congresses and the election of delegates at the polling unit, ward, and local government levels across the country.
In circulars issued by its national secretary, Rauf Aregbesola, the ADC said the congresses are expected to hold between January 20 and January 27, 2026.
The process, the party said, will lead to the emergence of delegates who will participate in its non-elective national convention scheduled for February 2026 in Abuja.
A statement by Bolaji Abdullahi, national publicity secretary of the party, said the decisions were reached at a meeting of the national working committee (NWC) held on November 27, 2025.
Abdullahi said the timetable and activities were approved in line with the resolutions of the NWC and in accordance with relevant provisions of the party’s constitution.
The ADC said further details on the membership exercise, congresses, and convention will be communicated to party members and stakeholders in due course.
Politics
INVESTIGATION: Why No Imo Governor Ever Controls Succession- The Untold Story
Imo State’s inability to sustain political succession from one elected governor to another is not accidental. It is the consequence of recurring structural failures rooted in elite conspiracy, federal power realignments, internal party implosions, zoning sensitivities, and the perennial arrogance of incumbency. From Achike Udenwa to Ikedi Ohakim and Rochas Okorocha, each administration fell victim to a combination of these forces, leaving behind a state where power is never inherited, only contested.
Achike Udenwa’s experience remains the most instructive example of how federal might and elite scheming can dismantle a governor’s succession plan. Governing between 1999 and 2007 under the PDP, Udenwa assumed that the party’s national dominance would guarantee internal cohesion in Imo. Instead, his tenure coincided with one of the most vicious intra-party wars the state has ever witnessed.
The Imo PDP split into two irreconcilable blocs. On one side was Udenwa’s grassroots-driven Onongono Group, powered by loyalists such as Alex Obi and anchored on local structures. On the other was a formidable Abuja faction populated by heavyweight figures including Kema Chikwe, Ifeanyi Araraume, Hope Uzodimma, Tony Ezenna, and others with direct access to federal influence. This was not a clash of personalities alone; it was a struggle over who controlled the levers of power beyond Owerri.
The conflict worsened when Udenwa openly aligned with then Vice President Atiku Abubakar during his bitter feud with President Olusegun Obasanjo. That alignment proved politically fatal. Obasanjo, determined to weaken Atiku’s network nationwide, withdrew federal support from governors perceived as loyal to the vice president. In Imo, the effect was immediate and devastating.
Federal agencies, party organs, and influence channels tilted decisively toward the Kema Chikwe-led Abuja faction. Udenwa lost effective control of the PDP structure, security leverage, and strategic influence. His foot soldiers in the Onongono Group could mobilise locally, but they could not withstand a coordinated assault backed by the centre.
His preferred successor, Charles Ugwu, never gained political altitude. By the time succession became imminent, Udenwa was already a governor without power. Even his later recalculations failed to reverse the tide. The party had slipped beyond his grasp.
The eventual outcome was politically ironic. Ikedi Ohakim emerged governor, backed by forces aligned with the federal establishment, notably Maurice Iwu—his kinsman and then Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Another Udenwa ally, Martin Agbaso, briefly tasted victory, only for his election to be cancelled. The lesson was brutal and unmistakable: without federal alignment, succession in Imo is almost impossible.
Notably, Udenwa’s record in office did not rescue him. Infrastructure development, relative stability, and administrative competence counted for little in the face of elite conspiracy operating simultaneously at state and federal levels. In Imo politics, performance is secondary to power alignment.
Ikedi Ohakim’s tenure presents a different dimension of failure. Unlike Udenwa, he never reached the point of succession planning. His administration was consumed by political survival. From 2007 to 2011, Ohakim governed amid persistent hostility from elites and a rapidly deteriorating public image.
Ohakim has consistently maintained that his downfall was orchestrated. Central to his claim is the allegation that he was blackmailed with a scandal involving the alleged assault of a Catholic priest, Reverend Father Eustace Eke. In a deeply religious state like Imo, the allegation was politically lethal.
Whether the claims were factual or exaggerated mattered less than their impact. The narrative overwhelmed governance, drowned out policy achievements, and turned public opinion sharply against him. Political elites who had midwifed his emergence quickly distanced themselves, sensing vulnerability.
By the 2011 election, Ohakim stood isolated. Party loyalty evaporated, elite cover disappeared, and voter sympathy collapsed. His re-election bid failed decisively. With that loss, any discussion of succession became irrelevant. His experience reinforces a core principle: a governor rejected by the electorate cannot dictate continuity.

*Uzodimma*
Rochas Okorocha’s rise in 2011 appeared to signal a break from Imo’s succession curse. Charismatic, populist, and financially powerful, he commanded party structures and grassroots loyalty. By his second term, he seemed politically unassailable.
Yet Okorocha committed the most consequential succession error in the state’s history. By attempting to impose his son-in-law, Uche Nwosu, as successor, he crossed from political strategy into dynastic ambition. That decision detonated his massive support base in the State overnight.
Imo’s political elites revolted almost unanimously. Party affiliation became secondary to a shared determination to stop what was widely perceived as an attempt to privatise public office. The revolt was elite-driven, strategic, and ruthless.
The zoning factor compounded the crisis. Okorocha hailed from Orlu zone; so did Nwosu. For many Imo voters, the prospect of Orlu retaining power through familial succession was unacceptable. What might have been tolerated as ambition became framed as entitlement.
This time, elite resistance aligned with popular sentiment. The electorate queued behind alternatives not necessarily out of conviction, but out of rejection. Crucially, Emeka Ihedioha emerged governor because Okorocha fatally miscalculated—splitting his base, provoking elite rebellion, and underestimating voter resentment. Okorocha’s formidable structure collapsed under internal rebellion and voter backlash, sealing his failure to produce a successor.
Hope Uzodimma’s current position must be assessed against this turbulent history. At present, the structural indicators are in his favour. He enjoys firm federal backing, controls the APC machinery in the state, and commands the support—or at least the compliance—of most major political elites.
Unlike Udenwa, Uzodimma is aligned with the centre. Unlike Ohakim, he has survived electoral tests. Unlike Okorocha, he has not openly flirted with dynastic politics. On the surface, the succession equation appears favorable.

*Udenwa*
However, Imo’s history cautions against certainty. Elite loyalty in the state is conditional and transactional. It endures only where interests are balanced, ambitions managed, and inclusion sustained. A wrong choice of successor could still provoke elite conspiracy, even if it emerges from within the ruling party.
The opposition remains weak and fragmented, with limited capacity to mobilize mass resistance. Yet voter apathy, now more pronounced than during the Udenwa and Okorocha eras, introduces a new risk. Disengaged electorates are unpredictable and often disruptive.

“Ohakim*
Ultimately, Uzodimma’s challenge is not opposition strength but elite psychology. Suppressed ambitions, if mishandled, can erupt. Succession in Imo has never been about coronation; it is about negotiation.

*Okorocha*
History is unforgiving to governors who confuse incumbency with ownership. Power in Imo is never transferred by decree. As 2027 approaches, the same forces that toppled past succession plans remain alive. Whether Uzodimma avoids their trap will depend not on power alone, but on restraint, balance, and political wisdom.
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