Orkar Coup: Why I Kept Mute For 35 Years – Col Lawan Gwadabe:

I call it Orkar’s April Fool version. Unfortunately, it came on the 22nd, not the 1st.

Question: There a popular belief that Abacha played a very significant role in foiling the coup…

Answer: I’ve given you the account I know, Abacha’s part is there, it’s written. What the senior officers did after that, I’m not privy to.

Abacha himself was fighting for his own survival. If his son hadn’t taken him back to his house, those two young officers who went to look for him had gone back again. So, he was lucky.

Read:

Question: Let’s talk about the 1990 coup. At the time, you were still in active service and serving as the governor of Niger State. By April 22, it will be 35 years since that coup attempt. From accounts of several actors, you played a significant role in foiling it. Can you share your recollections of that watershed moment in Nigeria’s history?

Answer: Don’t forget, I was a military governor then and if the Nigerian government were to fall, we’d all be gone. So, in a sense, it was also an act of self-preservation. We had to stay informed and take an active role.

I got involved early on because I had intelligence about their plans as far back as February 1990. We infiltrated the system. As a governor, I had extensive contacts across the country, and my intelligence sources were broad and effective.

Whenever I came across any potential threat to national security, I would compile a detailed report and send it to the president and the relevant security authorities. That was part of our training. That was the job.

Once I uncovered this particular plot, I began writing briefs regularly. Then I learned that Major Gideon Gwaza Orkar had been recruited into it.

Orkar was a good officer—I knew him well. He served under me when I was at the Directorate of Armour in Lagos. And whenever he came to Lagos for meetings while stationed in Shaki, he would stay at my house.
We had a strong connection.

He had also met me at the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA)—he was a cadet when I was about to graduate, so I was his senior. Later, he joined the Armoured Corps, where I served. So, I knew him as a bright young officer.

When I found out about his involvement, I felt he was being used as a kind of conduit for the Niger Delta agitators. So, I asked his commandant if, in the interest of national security, he could allow Orkar to meet with me.

I wanted to send him to the president directly.

The commandant agreed, saying they weren’t in the middle of training at the time. So, Orkar was sent to me.

I told him, “Gideon, you know I have vast information about what’s happening.” He acknowledged that. I said, “There are pockets of agitations across the country. At our last caucus meeting, we briefed our seniors, and they’ve been factoring this into their decision-making.”

For example, the establishment of OMPADEC was part of efforts to address grievances in the Niger Delta. With the 13% derivation that was eventually granted, the region received substantial resources to accelerate development. But has that really happened? Not quite.
Agitating officers in the Niger Delta hadn’t aligned with their leaders to understand what the federal government was doing—or failing to do.

There was a disconnect. And yes, there was radicalism in their thinking. Emotional responses can cloud rational judgment. So, while the claims of marginalisation had merit, the government was working on interventions.

I told Orkar, “Look, when they mention the Middle Belt—it’s just an aphorism. The Middle Belt is in Nigeria. Are you a Middle Belt officer?”

He replied, “No, sir. I’m a Nigerian officer.”

“Good,” I said. “So why are they trying to bring you into this? I don’t want to know what they’re telling you—but I’m giving you a chance, as one of us, to lay everything on the table with the president. Not to arrest them—but to disarm them.

Let the government talk with them and understand their frustrations.”
That was my intention.

He responded, “Whatever you ask me to do, sir, I will do.”

I reminded him, “If you’d done anything wrong, I could’ve had you arrested right here. But I didn’t. So go to the president and speak the truth about everything you know.”

He mentioned that his car wasn’t in good condition, and I told him not to worry. I called my ADC and Director-General of Government House. I said, “Orkar is your guest. He needs new tyres.”

The Niger State Supply Company provided four new tires for his car. The DG Government House gave him N20,000—quite a large amount back then—and he headed to Lagos.

To his credit, he left very early the next morning. I don’t recall the exact date, but it was a Wednesday in March. By 2 p.m., UK Bello called me and said, “Sir, the officer is here.”

I told him, “UK Bello, I beg you in the name of Almighty God, whatever the president is doing, he must see Orkar today.”

He said, “Consider it done, sir.” I had already phoned the president that morning to let him know Orkar was on his way.

Orkar sat in the ADC’s office until 6 p.m., there had been a Federal Executive Council meeting, which ran long. When the president returned and saw Orkar, he said, “Gideon, your boss told me you were coming. Okay, I’ve seen you, but I’m tired. Can you come back tomorrow?”

And that was it.

Orkar bantered a bit with UK Bello and left. But realistically, it’s likely he had already informed his co-conspirators and they were nearby in Lagos, awaiting the outcome of that meeting.

When that meeting didn’t happen, I believe it rattled them. They probably assumed their secret plan had been discovered; how else could we have known so much? So I believe they panicked, changed their timeline, and launched the coup earlier than planned.

That’s why it didn’t succeed as they had envisioned.

Question: Do you think, former President Babangida could have been aware of their plans? Could that be why he didn’t meet with Gideon Orkar that day?

Answer: No, I don’t think so. Whatever he knew about the situation came from the information we were providing him. But I felt that once the plot reached a certain stage, it was time for Orkar to brief him directly—so the government could step in, disarm the agitators, and allow things to return to normal.

Nobody was interested in arresting anyone. If they had genuine grievances, fine, what are those grievances? If the authorities felt it was necessary, they could sit down and listen. At that point, the whole thing was still in its embryonic stage.

Question: When Orkar couldn’t see the president, did he reach out to you?

No, he didn’t get back to me.

Question: Did you reach out to him?

No, I didn’t.

Now you know.