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The Aburi Conference of 1967 and the Constitutional Crisis of the Nigerian Federation
In early January 1967, Nigeria was standing at a dangerous crossroads. Less than seven years after independence, the country was already deeply fractured by political rivalry, ethnic violence, and military intervention in governance. The coups of 1966 had destroyed trust among Nigeria’s regions and within the armed forces. It was in this tense atmosphere that Nigerian leaders agreed to meet in Aburi, Ghana, for what would become one of the most important and controversial meetings in the nation’s history.
The meeting, held between January 4 and January 5, 1967, brought together the leaders of the Federal Military Government and the regional military governors. The head of the federal government was Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, while the Eastern Region was represented by its military governor, Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu. Other regional leaders and senior military officers were also present. The goal was simple in theory but difficult in practice. It was to find a peaceful political solution that would keep Nigeria united and prevent the country from sliding into civil war.
Aburi was chosen deliberately as a neutral and calm location outside Nigeria. At the time, Ojukwu insisted that his safety could not be guaranteed anywhere within the country. Ghana, under the leadership of Lieutenant General Joseph Ankrah, offered a peaceful environment where all sides could speak freely without fear. The quiet hill town of Aburi provided a sharp contrast to the tension and uncertainty gripping Nigeria.
The discussions at Aburi were shaped by recent painful experiences. The January 1966 coup had led to the killing of several prominent Northern and Western political leaders, creating resentment and suspicion. The counter coup of July 1966 deepened divisions. By the end of 1966, Nigeria was a country united in name but divided in reality.
At the conference, participants expressed a shared desire to avoid the use of force and to rebuild trust. The outcome of the meeting was a set of resolutions commonly referred to as the Aburi Accord. Central to these agreements was the understanding that the Supreme Military Council would remain the highest authority in the country and that decisions affecting the whole nation should be taken collectively. There was also an emphasis on greater consultation among regions and a recognition of the need to respect regional sensitivities, particularly in matters of security and governance.
Another important aspect of the Aburi discussions was the structure of the Nigerian Army. Given the breakdown of trust within the military after the coups and counter coups, there was agreement that the armed forces needed to be reorganised in a way that reassured all regions. The intention was to prevent any group from feeling dominated or threatened by others. Above all, the spirit of Aburi was one of compromise, dialogue, and the rejection of violence as a solution to political problems.
However, the hope generated at Aburi did not last long. Once the leaders returned to Nigeria, serious disagreements emerged over how the resolutions should be interpreted and implemented. Ojukwu believed that the Aburi Accord granted significant autonomy to the regions and limited the power of the central government. Gowon and other federal officials later argued that while the meeting promoted consultation, it did not dismantle federal authority or turn Nigeria into a loose confederation.
These differing interpretations quickly became a source of conflict. In an attempt to formalise the Aburi resolutions, the Federal Military Government drafted Decree Number 8. Ojukwu rejected this decree, claiming it did not faithfully reflect what had been agreed in Ghana. Trust between the parties collapsed further, and dialogue gave way to suspicion and hardened positions.
By May 1967, the political crisis had reached a breaking point. Ojukwu declared the Eastern Region an independent state known as the Republic of Biafra, citing the failure of the federal government to protect Easterners and honour the Aburi agreements. The federal government rejected the secession, and by July 1967, Nigeria was at war with itself. The Nigerian Civil War would last until January 1970 and result in immense human suffering and loss of life.
Today, the Aburi Conference is remembered as Nigeria’s last serious attempt to resolve its internal crisis through dialogue before the outbreak of war. Historians often describe it as a moment filled with both promise and tragedy. It demonstrated that Nigerian leaders were capable of sitting together to seek peace, yet it also exposed the dangers of vague agreements, mutual distrust, and weak mechanisms for implementation.
The legacy of Aburi continues to shape discussions about federalism, national unity, and conflict resolution in Nigeria. It stands as a reminder that peace requires not only dialogue, but also clarity, sincerity, and a shared commitment to implementation. More than half a century later, the lessons of Aburi remain deeply relevant to Nigeria’s ongoing journey as a diverse and complex nation.